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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine the extent of goodwill impairment in listed companies of 
China and the audited disclosure of goodwill. China is an important adopter of 
International Financial Standards but the question remains that, as a recent adopter, to 
what extent contentious issues such as goodwill impairment are implemented. The 
research analyzes the financial and share market information gathered from the top 50 
companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The findings reveal that goodwill 
amortization has been discontinued and replaced by goodwill impairment, but 
interestingly the Big Four firms seem more likely to recognize a goodwill impairment loss 
than smaller, local audit firms.  This would imply that the Big Four Western audit firms 
with a plethora of clients are less likely to be intimidated by Chinese managers into 
ignoring impairment than small local firms, which may be more dependent on these large 
Chinese corporations for their existence. However, findings indicate that negative 
financial and share market information show some correlation with goodwill impairment 
where impairment occurs. The most significant finding is that the analysis reveals that 
there remains a wider problem with adequate disclosure in the notes to the accounts as to 
whether and why goodwill should be impaired or not. 
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Introduction 
 
The financial crisis has affected the world’s economies and produced significant effects on 
financial reporting in the last ten years (Laghi, Mattei, & Marcantonio, 2013). The “real value” 
of goodwill shown in the financial statements of listed companies has been one of the most 
controversial issues for the investors and analysts. 
 
The International Financial Reporting Standards 3 (IFRS 3), Business Combinations provides 
specific guidelines on how to measure and recognize goodwill at acquisition date. The 
International Accounting Standards (IAS 38 & 36), also stipulate that goodwill should not be 
amortized. Instead, such assets should be tested for impairment annually or more frequently if 
events or changes in circumstances indicate a decline in value. The increasing demand for 
transparency and comparability from global business has made the convergence of accounting 
standards an irresistible historical trend, especially in China, which is now one of the world’s 
major business drivers. With regard to convergence, Zhang and Liu (2010) comment that the 
issuance of a total of 38 new business accounting standards in China in 2006 has allowed 
substantial convergence with IFRS. Although there are a few remaining differences, China is 
working on all accounting standards being convergent with IFRS such as business related 
parties. 
 
With regard to the audit context of impairment, in late 2013, The Economist journal published 
an article entitled “Goodwill Hunting” which reported a conspicuous lack of impairment 
among public Indian companies and identified as a possible explanation “arm twisting” of 
auditors by powerful company executives – especially subjecting smaller, local firms to 
pressure (J. Wang & Hooper, 2014). To find out whether a similar situation exists in China, 
this paper sets out to examine the write-down practices of the top 50 public companies listed 
on the Shanghai exchange.   
 
The aim of the paper is to conduct an empirical study with four main objectives. First, to 
examine the extent of disclosure of accounting policies by the listed companies as to the fair 
value of their goodwill. Second, to compare the goodwill treatment among companies audited 
by Big Four firms and companies audited by local firms. Third, is to identify if there are any 
companies that should have recognized any goodwill impairment and did not. Finally, to 
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evaluate the extent of disclosure in the notes to the accounts as to whether or why there is 
impairment or not. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, there is a literature review that discusses the 
amortization versus impairment argument, which is followed by a review of the usefulness of 
the price-earnings ratio as a guide to possible impairment. Following the literature review, the 
paper outlines the research questions and method with the overall theme of asking: what is the 
case as to impairment in China? To fulfill this objective, three research questions are developed, 
followed by a description of the method of the empirical investigation. Next, the findings are 
identified from the study together with a discussion of the findings in relation to the research 
questions. Finally, a conclusion and suggestions for future research are discussed. 
 
Literature Review  
 
Amortization versus Impairment 
According to IAS 22 Business Combination (issued in 1993 and superseded by IFRS 3 in 
2004), goodwill should be capitalized and amortized over its useful life, which should not 
exceed five years unless a longer period of up to 20 years can be justified. However, this was 
conceptually inconsistent with US practice, which amortizes goodwill up to 40 years 
(Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No.17).  Later in 1998, IAS 22 was revised to 
require goodwill to be capitalized and amortized, given a presumption of useful life of up to 20 
years, followed by annual impairment tests if a life of over 20 years was used. 
 
Based on the respondents to ED 3, Business Combinations (IASB 2002), amortization was 
viewed as the only practical solution to the intractable problem on goodwill (IASB 2004d). 
Although the useful life of goodwill could not be reliably measured and predicted at a 
satisfactory level, it was a practical and well-established principle consistent with the 
accounting treatment taken to other tangible and intangible assets with finite useful lives. It 
also provided an appropriate balance between conceptual soundness and operationally at an 
acceptable cost (Wiese, 2005). 
 
However, amortization ignores the fact that some forms of goodwill can have an indefinite 
useful life, or cannot be reliably measured and predicted at a satisfactory level. Thus, it 
introduces some problems with regard to the relevance of financial reporting and its usefulness. 
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It may be argued that amortization may cause alarm among users of financial statements 
because it deducts from earnings and affects profits in subsequent periods(V. Wang, 2011). 
Also, prior studies (Jennings, LeClere, & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle, Reynolds-Moehrle, & 
Wallace, 2001) provide empirical evidence that systematic amortization of goodwill over an 
arbitrary period does not provide useful information to the users of the financial statements. 
 
Amortization may make it more difficult for investors to use the measure of earnings and to 
predict future profitability. Moreover, goodwill does not necessarily wear out and that an 
annual amortisation expense over an arbitrary life is a meaningless number. In 2001, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) expressed its opinion that it is virtually 
impossible to predict accurately the useful life of goodwill and amortisation of goodwill is not 
a faithful representation of the true pattern of declining goodwill (FASB 2001b). Subsequently, 
FASB published the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (“SFAS”) 142, which 
prohibits the amortisation of goodwill. It requires instead annual impairment tests to reflect the 
true and fair view of the assets values. The purpose of this accounting rule is to encourage 
management to communicate privately held information about goodwill and provide 
stakeholders with better quality information to assess the performance and future cash flows of 
the company (AbuGhazaleh, Al-Hares, & Haddad, 2012; Kavcic, Jerman, & Kavcic, 2013; Li, 
Shroff, Venkataraman, & Zhang, 2011). 
 
To seek convergence and global harmonisation, the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) followed the FASB’s approach in 2004 by replacing IAS 22 with IFRS 3, thereby 
converging with US GAAP. IFRS 3 states that from the beginning of the first annual period 
beginning on or after 31 March 2004, all entities must discontinue amortising goodwill and 
must test goodwill for impairment. In the same year, IASB issued IAS 36 Impairment of Assets, 
which provided a two-step approach for goodwill impairment testing as follows. 
 
Step 1: Compare the carrying amount of the unit, including the goodwill, with its recoverable 
amount. The recoverable amount of such a unit should be measured, consistent with the 
requirements in IAS 36, as the higher of value in use and net selling price. If the recoverable 
amount of the unit exceeds its carrying amount, goodwill is not impaired. If not, then follow 
Step 2. 
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Step 2: Compare the implied value of goodwill with its carrying amount. Implied goodwill is 
the excess of the recoverable amount of the unit to which the goodwill has been allocated over 
the fair value of the net identifiable assets that the entity would recognise if it acquired that unit 
in a business combination on the date of the impairment test. Any excess of the carrying 
amount of goodwill over its implied value is recognised immediately, in profit or 
loss, as an impairment loss. Any remaining excess of the carrying amount of the unit over its 
recoverable amount is recognised as an impairment loss and allocated to the other assets of the 
unit on a pro rata basis, based on the carrying amount of each asset in the unit. 
 
(V. Wang, 2011) found that the change from amortisation to impairment promotes and 
improves the investors' understanding of the components of companies’ earnings and also 
removes their confusions as to the relevance and usefulness of goodwill amortisation 
information. Subsequently, amortization of goodwill in most listed companies in Anglo-Saxon 
countries has been abandoned, and, in accordance with IFRS 3 there is testing for impairment 
annually or whenever there is an indication that the goodwill may be impaired. Companies 
must now recognise an impairment loss when the carrying amount exceeds the recoverable 
amount (Kavcic et al., 2013). 
 
However, goodwill impairment loss among companies may show some correlation with 
performance and investor confidence (Li et al., 2011). First, the goodwill impairment may be 
found to be a leading indicator of a decline in prospective sales and operating profits, and a 
failure to realise the expected benefits from prior acquisitions. Second, overpayment for a prior 
acquisition could be another potential contributing factor causing companies to deplete the 
overpayment by impairment in subsequent periods. Third, the announcement of goodwill 
impairment could influence investors and financial analysts to revise their expectations of 
future company prospects. 
 
The goodwill impairment approach is not without its problems. Firstly, the impairment test 
may impose a significant cost on companies (Wiese, 2005). The valuation of goodwill is 
complex and unlikely to be verifiable, thus specialized experts and valuation techniques are 
often required for an impairment test (Kavcic et al., 2013). According to a survey conducted 
by Grant Thornton & NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., 71% of selected CFOs in the survey would 
use “outside assistance” to perform the impairment test. Secondly, the impairment test may be 
liable to manipulation. The impairment criteria provided by the standard are drafted in such a 
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way as to leave significant room for managerial discretion, interpretation, judgment and bias 
(Massoud & Raiborn, 2003). Companies may act opportunistically by using their greater 
managerial reporting discretion to avoid reporting an impairment loss (Li et al., 2011). 
Management may act for their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Third, the 
uncertainty and subjective judgments involved in impairment tests may affect the reliability of 
the information provided by the disclosures demanded by users of financial statements to assess 
future cash flow (Kavcic et al., 2013; V. Wang, 2011). Such uncertainty and subjectivity may 
make it no less arbitrary than amortisation (Wiese, 2005). Lastly, there are possibilities for 
companies to enhance their earnings per share by avoiding any impairment on goodwill. This 
could deceive investors into believing that such companies are doing better than anticipated, 
thus increasing and overvaluing their stock prices (Basi & Penning, 2002). For this reason The 
Economist (2013) reports that managers may “twist the arms of auditors” to delay impairment. 
Wang & Hooper (2014) found that there is even more inconsistency around disclosure of 
impairment as nearly half of the top 50 companies analysed on the Bombay exchange fail to 
mention any write down of goodwill. Some companies claim that they were testing for 
impairment but no case of actual impairment was reported. This, in spite of some companies, 
is reporting declining earnings and share price. 
 
The accounting treatment of goodwill has been a long-standing issue of concern to accountants
 and accounting standards committees for more than a decade. Both amortization and 
impairment tests involve a certain degree of subjectivity, and have different drawbacks either 
in implementation difficulties or theoretical support. There is no perfect solution to satisfy 
everyone on the options of how to recognise a decline in the value of goodwill. 
 
Although the impairment test is costly, time consuming and susceptible to manipulation, it is 
arguably better approach for reflecting future prospects of investments and gives a true and fair 
view of the business. It is worth noting that the IASB has recently decided to conduct a post-
implementation review on IFRS 3, which introduces some possible solutions to address the 
existing issues encountered. This includes improving the existing impairment test rules and 
disclosure requirements (IAS 36) and possibly reintroducing goodwill amortisation in addition 
to the impairment test (Laghi et al., 2013). 
 
Price earnings ratio 
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The price-earnings ratio (the “PE ratio”) is one of the investment ratios used by investors for 
performance analysis of listed companies. As it measures trends, it may also have some bearing 
on whether a company’s goodwill should be impaired. It is calculated by using the current share 
price divided by the earnings per share. The PE ratio reflects a fundamental relationship 
between a company’s performance and its value (Cheng & Noland, 1995). The current share 
price in the numerator is the market’s anticipation of the future earnings to be added from 
prospective sales and can be obtained from the stock market at any transaction date. The 
earnings per share in the denominator is the current earnings generated from the current sales 
and can be obtained from the annual report or earnings announcement. For example, the 
average trading share price for the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) in 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) on 31 December 2013 was RMB4.10, and its audited earnings 
per share as at 31 December 2013 was RMB0.68. Therefore, the PE ratio of ICBC at 31 
December 2013 was 6.03. 
 
The PE ratio expresses two different meanings for investors. It shows number of years 
companies would take to earn the equivalent amounts that investors paid for the shares and 
indicates average return rates based on a company’s current level of profits (Shirley et al., 
2012). In this example, the ICBC’s shares sold for 6.03 times its earnings and at the current 
rate of earnings (RMB0.68), it shows that the ICBC would take about 6.03 years to earn the 
equivalent of what an investor paid for the shares on 31 December 2013. In other words, 
investors who purchased one share in the ICBC at a market price (RMB4.10) can expect to 
earn an average return of 11% (RMB0.68/RMB4.10) at the current level of profit. The PE ratio 
can be interpreted as a composite measure of investor’s hopes and fears (Wisniewski, 
Lightfoot, & Lilley, 2012), and reflect the anticipated earnings growth of the company. If the 
investors expect the company to have more future earnings than current earnings, the PE ratio 
should be high, or if the investors expect lower future earnings than current earnings, the PE 
ratio should be low. Moreover, the PE ratio is the most informative ratio when being applied 
in cross-sectional analysis. The investors also can evaluate the earnings growth prospects and 
risk by comparing a company’s PE ratio to the industry average. 
 
On the other hand, the PE ratio is not without its limitations when applied in fundamental 
analysis. First, it is difficult and expensive to collect accurate and reliable data from companies, 
stock markets and government institutions, especially in some countries such as China and 
India. The trends and indications derived from those estimated PE ratios might misdirect 
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investors’ decision making. Second, the PE ratios may vary between industries and reflect a 
strong relationship with the business life cycle. For example, financially strong, or ‘blue chip’ 
companies and companies experiencing substantial growth (e.g. internet business) may have 
higher PE ratios while companies in mature or declining phases of the business life cycle tend 
to have lower PE ratios. Last, the PE ratio reflects not so much the earnings generated by 
companies, but more the prospects for future earnings. The bubble phenomenon in the late 
1990s is a good example, the share prices of some dot com companies, particularly those with 
meager earnings, were selling at levels that resulted in high PE ratios, and consequently 
attracted a large number of irrational investors. Some observers expressed their concerns that 
these PE ratios could only be sustained for a short period of time but not in the long run. As it 
turned out the share prices of almost all dotcom companies subsequently crashed and investors 
suffered losses. Although there are some limitations in relation to inaccurate data, different 
business life cycles and certain economic phenomenon, the PE ratio is one of the more useful 
investment ratios used in fundamental analysis of inefficient markets to identify mispriced 
shares and guide investment decision making. It also reflects the level of confidence expressed 
by investors in a company’s prospective earnings growth, and mirrors a fundamental 
relationship between a company’s performance and its value. Thus, a falling PE ratio may 
signal a need for impairment testing. 
 
Summary 
The literature shows that on average the market revises its expectations downward on the 
announcement of goodwill impairment and the downward revision is related to the magnitude 
of the impairment loss. Overall, the evidence suggests that the announcement of goodwill 
impairment reveals negative information about the firm to the market (AbuGhazaleh et al., 
2012; Laghi et al., 2013; Li et al., 2011). 
Research Questions and Method            
The aim of the paper is to examine the extent of goodwill impairment in listed companies 
of China and the extent of the audited disclosure of goodwill. To do this, the following 
research questions are asked of the top 50 companies listed on the SSE: 
1) How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill and what accounting policies are 
disclosed to measure goodwill? 
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2) How many SSE 50 companies have recognised goodwill impairment? 
3) How many SSE 50 companies have suffered declining share price and price/earnings 
ratios, and how many of those have recognized impairment?  
 
Method 
The present study covers the only listed companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE). It 
includes both government and private sector companies. The enterprises are chosen on the basis 
of market capitalization. The top fifty corporate enterprises are considered because of their 
size, SSE listing and because their accounting and market data are publicly available. The 
period covered is centered around the year 2012 as it is considered a reasonably good year to 
analyze goodwill due to number of acquisitions by Chinese companies. The data analysed from 
annual reports of the companies involves the notes of goodwill in the financial statements, 
minority interest, profit, auditors, earning per share and notes on account of goodwill. 
 
By the end of 2012, there were 998 listed stocks on the SSE with a combined total market 
capitalization of RMB 16 billion (US$2,645 billion), which accounted for over 30% of China’s 
GDP in 2012. There are two types of tradable shares on the SSE: A-shares and B-shares. A-shares 
are RMB denominated ordinary shares and sold to Chinese citizens and qualifying foreign 
institutions. B-shares are US dollar denominated and sold to foreign investors. The A-shares 
include state shares, legal entity shares, employee shares and public shares. The public shares 
are freely tradable shares on the SSE and held by general investors. Since 1996, general investors 
have been able to subscribe to new issues of public shares through a lottery mechanism (Wong 
et al., 2006; Jiang & Leger, 2010). 
 
All the share information of SSE 50 companies is based on the RMB denominated A-shares. 
The share price and the earnings per share for the respective SSE 50 companies in 2011 and 
2012 were gathered from the SSE website. The respective PE ratios in 2011 and 2012 were 
calculated by using the share price divided by the earnings per share. In addition, the share 
price as at June 2013 was also collected to calculate the estimated interim PE ratio as at June 
2013 based on the earnings per share in 2012. All the financial and share market information 
were incorporated in a spreadsheet for comparison and correlated analysis. 
 
Findings 
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The findings from the financial and share market information are presented below in relation 
to the research questions that guided this study. 
 
Research question one 
How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill and what accounting policies are employed 
to measure goodwill?  
According to the collected financial information all companies show a minority interest in their 
balance sheets as at 31 December 2012, while only 33 out of 50 companies (66%) were found 
to have goodwill in their balance sheets as at 31 December 2012. This means 17 companies 
had a minority interest but no goodwill.  The explanation for this must be that goodwill has 
been amortised to zero. Nonetheless, a note to this effect in the annual reports would have been 
useful as it would be useful information for users.  It is worth noting, in the light of this finding 
that all the SSE 50 companies claim to have discontinued goodwill amortisation and adopted 
goodwill impairment testing on annual basis.  
 
The main impairment test method employed by the companies, that disclosed a method, is to 
calculate the present value of the future cash flows in the next five years based on a market 
discount rate and compare it with the carrying amount of goodwill then identify if there is any 
impairment to be recognised. The policy adopted appears in notes to financial statement of the 
annual report as exemplified in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: The sample note in relation to goodwill 
 
Code Name Auditor Note ref. Notes 
600585 Anhui Conch Cement 
Company Limited 
KPMG 2(17) No goodwill amortization. 
2(18) Annual goodwill impairment test. 
5(15) The cash generating amount from
 goodwill is based on the 
present value of projected cash flow in the 
next five years with pre-tax discount rate at 
11.99% 
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It is worth noting that discount rate adopted may affect the accuracy of the projected future 
cash flow generated from goodwill, which may affect their testing and impairment recognition 
(Wang, 2011). Although impairment testing has its disadvantages, the accounting policies 
disclosed in notes to financial statements of the annual report in relation to goodwill 
measurement support the view that the current set of accounting standards issued in China in 
2006 has reached substantial convergence with IFRS (Zhang & Liu, 2010). On the other hand, 
the remaining 17 companies (34%) not showing any goodwill balance as at 31 December 2012 
in annual reports may indicate that the original goodwill has already been amortized or 
impaired to zero in prior years. This conjecture reveals the uncertainty surrounding the 
treatment of goodwill in the absence of any disclosure in the notes to the accounts. 
 
Research question two 
How many SSE 50 companies recognise goodwill impairment?  
Among the 33 companies with a goodwill balance as at 31 December 2012, a total of nine 
companies (18% of SSE 50) have disclosed some goodwill impairment, of which four 
companies recognised the impairment in prior years and five companies made the impairment 
in the current year of 2012. The information from the 9 companies is shown in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: The sample note in relation to goodwill 
Code Name Auditor Goodwill impairment Note 
 
Referenc
 
Note 
Prior year  
RMB 
Current Year 
RMB 
600028 Sinopec KPMG 1,955m - (15) No detail 
600036 China Merchants 
Bank 
KPMG - 579m (19) No detail 
600104 SAIC Moto Deloitte 2.9m - 6(20) No detail 
600123 Shanxi Lanhua Xinhua CPAs - 21m 5(14) Internal merger 
600383 Gemdale Corp. Deloitte - 7.6m 6(12) No detail 
600999 China Merchants 
Security 
Shingwing CPAs* 22.9m - (14) No detail 
601318 Ping An Group EY - 48m 7(19) No detail 
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Table 2 above shows that seven out of nine companies (78%) were audited by Big Four firms 
and the other two companies were audited by local firms. As more than half of the 33 
companies that disclosed goodwill were audited by firms other that the Big Four, it may be 
considered that companies audited by Big Four firms are more likely to impair goodwill. In 
other words, of the 33 companies with goodwill for testing, 39% of those audited by Big Four 
firms were impaired, while only13% of companies audited by smaller firms were impaired. 
 
According to the notes to accounts in the annual report of China Merchants Security, goodwill 
impairment amounted to RMB22.9 million, which came about from two loss making 
businesses acquired by the company in August 2006 and June 2007 respectively. The account 
notes reveal that both businesses were unable to generate superior returns from the original 
recognised goodwill totaling RMB22.9 million based on current business operations. Therefore 
the entire goodwill balance totaling RMB22.9 million was fully impaired. This finding also 
supports the view that the companies should recognise an impairment loss when the companies 
failed to realise the expected benefits from prior acquisitions (Kavcic et al., 2013). 
 
 
However, generally among the SSE 50 companies there is inadequate disclosure on goodwill 
testing and as the literature reveals, the quality of impairment reporting is lower where 
regulatory and institutional infrastructure is weaker. A lack of adequate disclosure among the 
nine companies that recognized impairment is revealed by the analysis. The relevant national 
regulatory authorities should take appropriate enforcement actions to improve the quality of 
impairment reporting (Graham, 2013). 
 
Research question three 
How many SSE 50 companies should have tested for possible goodwill impairment?  
 
Table 3: Companies (24) that did not impair  
601818 China Everbright 
Bank 
KPMG* 4,738m - (19) No detail 
601899 Zijin Mining EY - 1.6m 5(16) No detail 
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The Table 3 above shows the 24 (out of 33) companies with goodwill balance as at 31 
December 2012 that have not recognized any goodwill impairment for the year. Eleven of these 
companies used Big Four audit firms, while the remainder (13) used second tier or local audit 
firms. The share market and financial information of the 24 companies is shown above in terms 
of share price, price/earnings trends, and goodwill. Although all the 24 companies should have 
gone through impairment tests, 12 companies (50%) were found with decreased profit after tax 
 
Name 
 
Auditor 
 
Share price RMB 
 
PE Ratio 
 
  RMB Profit 
 
Goodwill 
   2011 
 
2012 
 
2013'06 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
201306 
 
2011 (m) 
 
2012 (m) 
 
Change 
 
Amount (m) 
 
CITIC Securities 
 
EY 
 
9.71 
 
13.36 
 
10.13 
 
7.89 
 
35.16 
 
26.66 
 
12,604 
 
4,307 
 
-65.8% 
 
501 
 
Anhui Conch Cement 
 
KPMG 
 
15.65 
 
18.45 
 
13.38 
 
7.15 
 
15.50 
 
11.24 
 
11,824 
 
6,462 
 
-45.3% 
 
212 
 
Xiamen Tungsten 
Fujian 
Huaxing 
 
 
29.67 
 
38.35 
 
26.70 
 
19.78 
 
49.81 
 
34.68 
 
1,493 
 
881 
 
-41.0% 
 
16 
 
China Pacific Insurance 
 
EY 
 
19.21 
 
22.50 
 
15.93 
 
19.80 
 
38.14 
 
27.00 
 
8,393 
 
5,130 
 
-38.9% 
 
962 
Shanxi Lu An 
Environmental 
 
BDO 
 
21.16 
 
21.78 
 
11.96 
 
12.67 
 
19.45 
 
10.68 
 
3,339 
 
2,050 
 
-38.6% 
 
133 
 
SANY 
 
RSM 
 
12.54 
 
10.57 
 
7.51 
 
11.00 
 
14.09 
 
10.01 
 
9,361 
 
6,011 
 
-35.8% 
 
41 
 
Everbright Securities 
 
BDO 
 
10.20 
 
14.10 
 
10.20 
 
22.67 
 
48.62 
 
35.17 
 
1,595 
 
1,033 
 
-35.2% 
 
233 
 
Yang Quan Coal 
 
BDO 
 
15.18 
 
14.16 
 
9.04 
 
12.97 
 
14.91 
 
9.52 
 
2,711 
 
2,246 
 
-17.2% 
 
51 
 
Zhongjin Gold 
 
RSM 
 
17.51 
 
16.63 
 
9.29 
 
18.24 
 
31.38 
 
17.53 
 
2,490 
 
2,087 
 
-16.2% 
 
643 
 
PetroChina 
 
PwC 
 
9.74 
 
9.04 
 
7.61 
 
13.34 
 
14.35 
 
12.08 
 
146,007 
 
130,618 
 
-10.5% 
 
7,582 
 
Huatai Securities 
 
Tianjian 
 
 
7.82 
 
9.80 
 
8.06 
 
24.44 
 
33.79 
 
27.79 
 
1,821 
 
1,661 
 
-8.8% 
 
51 
 
HaiTong Securities 
 
BDO 
 
7.41 
 
10.05 
 
9.38 
 
19.50 
 
30.45 
 
28.42 
 
3,282 
 
3,234 
 
-1.4% 
 
697 
 
China Southern Railway 
 
EY 
 
4.33 
 
4.96 
 
3.60 
 
13.12 
 
16.53 
 
12.00 
 
4,743 
 
4,852 
 
2.3% 
 
97 
 
Guanghui Energy 
 
Da Hua 
 
 
20.58 
 
16.39 
 
12.96 
 
40.35 
 
58.54 
 
46.29 
 
963 
 
985 
 
2.3% 
 
111 
 
Sinohydro 
Zhongtia
nyun 
 
 
4.09 
 
3.79 
 
2.88 
 
8.35 
 
8.81 
 
6.70 
 
3,941 
 
4,361 
 
10.7% 
 
350 
 
Shan Dong Gold 
Beijing 
Tianyuan
 
 
28.39 
 
37.75 
 
32.13 
 
21.19 
 
24.67 
 
21.00 
 
1,983 
 
2,217 
 
11.8% 
 
665 
 
China Northern Railway 
 
KPMG 
 
4.25 
 
4.50 
 
3.76 
 
11.81 
 
13.24 
 
11.06 
 
3,105 
 
3,536 
 
13.9% 
 
14 
 
ICBC 
 
EY 
 
4.24 
 
4.10 
 
4.02 
 
7.07 
 
6.03 
 
5.91 
 
208,445 
 
238,691 
 
14.5% 
 
8,821 
 
Bank of Communications 
 
Deloitte 
 
4.48 
 
4.94 
 
4.07 
 
5.46 
 
5.61 
 
4.63 
 
50,817 
 
58,476 
 
15.1% 
 
322 
 
China Construction 
 
PwC 
 
2.91 
 
3.90 
 
3.27 
 
6.47 
 
7.50 
 
6.29 
 
19,446 
 
22,777 
 
17.1% 
 
1,917 
 
Agricultural Bank of China 
 
Deloitte 
 
2.62 
 
2.80 
 
2.46 
 
6.89 
 
6.22 
 
5.47 
 
121,956 
 
145,131 
 
19.0% 
 
1,381 
 
POLY Real Estate 
 
BDO 
 
10.00 
 
13.60 
 
9.91 
 
9.09 
 
11.53 
 
8.40 
 
7,367 
 
9,979 
 
35.4% 
 
10 
 
Industrial Bank 
 
Deloitte 
 
12.52 
 
16.69 
 
14.77 
 
5.31 
 
5.18 
 
4.59 
 
25,597 
 
34,927 
 
36.4% 
 
446 
 
Kangmei Pharmaceutical 
 
GP CPAs 
 
11.22 
 
13.21 
 
19.23 
 
23.87 
 
20.02 
 
29.14 
 
1,005 
 
1,441 
 
43.4% 
 
170 
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in 2012 compared with 2011 and 23 companies (96%) decreased their PE ratio and share price 
as at June 2013 compared with 2012.  
 
The decreases in share price, profit and PE ratios for 12 companies suggest that some 
impairment of goodwill may be warranted to reflect the deteriorating financial performance 
and declining confidence expressed by investors in relation to prospective earnings growth. For 
example, Zhongin Gold’s share price fell from Y16.63 to Y9.29 and its PE ratio fell from 31.38 
to 17.53 between 2012 and 2013. Xiamen Tungsten also reports drops in share price a d PE 
ration from 2012 to 2013, while many of the companies in Table 4 that reported impairment 
experienced smaller declines in share price and PE ratios. Of course, these indicators do not 
tell the whole story but the analysis of trends do highlight the issue, particular when Zhongin 
Gold and Xiamen Tungsten are audited by smaller local firms. Such trends would be consistent 
with Li et al.’s (2011) study that found correlations between goodwill impairment and share 
price, PE ratios and investor confidence. However, some companies may be reluctant to 
recognise impairment because it would influence investor behavior and further bring down the 
share price and PE ratios. 
 
Table 4: Companies that impaired goodwill 
Name Auditor RMB Share Price PE Ratio Goodwill Impt 
  2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Amount 
(RMBm) 
Amounts 
(RMBm) 
Sinopec KPMG 7.18 6.8 4.18 8.65 9.32 5.73 6,257 1,955 
China Merchants 
Bank KPMG 11.47 13.75 11.6 7.11 6.55 5.52 9,598 579 
SAIC Moto Deloitte 14.14 17.1 13.21 7.73 9.1 7.03 85 3 
Sharui Lanhua Science  
Xinghua 
CPA 30.44 20.1 12 20.36 12.37 7.7 174 21 
Gemdale Corporation Deloitte 4.95 6.74 6.86 7.39 8.87 5.03 8 8 
China Merchants 
Securities 
Shinwing 
CPA 10.18 10.55 10.4 23.67 10.14 29.71 10 23 
Ping An of China EY 14.44 45.29 34.76 13.78 17.9 13.74 11,769 48 
China Everbright Bank KPMG 2.88 3.05 2.85 6.45 5.2 4.98 1,281 4,718 
Zijin Mining EY 1.82 3.83 2.39 14.69 15.96 9.96 497 2 
 
 
Table 4 shows that as at June 2013, the share price and PE ratio decreased for companies, which 
disclosed goodwill impairment in 2012.  This could mean that impairment once announced 
pushes a share price slide further, or it could be that the share price and PE ratio merely reflects 
16 
 
the need for impairment. Either way, it supports the conclusion that PE ratios can reflect 
investors' hopes and fears (Wisniewski et al., 2012) and that market information spreads very 
quickly and is incorporated into the share prices (Malkiel, 2003). On the other hand, some 
companies may exert greater influence over the local audit firms to maintain their earnings per 
share at a satisfactory level without taking any goodwill impairment in order to affect investor 
behavior and prevent share prices sliding further (Basi & Penning, 2002). The latter could apply 
to companies like Zhongin Gold and Xiamen Tungsten. 
 
 
Conclusion and suggestions for future research 
The paper investigates goodwill recognition and measurement in SSE 50 companies in China, 
and suggests a correlation between SSE 50 companies, their auditors and impairment.  It also 
explores the linkage between goodwill impairment and share market information. First, all SSE 
50 companies have discontinued goodwill amortization and adopted goodwill impairment 
testing which is in line with IFRS and with the literature in relation to goodwill amortization 
versus goodwill impairment. Second, it appears from the literature and from this investigation 
that the Big Four auditors are in a stronger position to drive SSE 50 companies to recognise or 
disclose goodwill impairment based on changes in operational earnings, financial performance 
and investor confidence. Third, and perhaps most importantly these SSE 50 companies disclose 
very little information around goodwill in their notes to accounts.  
 
The findings of this study point to some interesting topics for future research. First, most SSE 
50 companies disclosed goodwill impairment losses in annual reports without providing any 
explanations in the notes. Future research could therefore examine the circumstances by which 
goodwill impairment is recognized in Chinese listed companies with particular emphasis on 
size and reputation of the audit firm engaged by company. This last point is of significance 
because from this preliminary investigation it would seem that small local audit firms are more 
beholden to their clients and less likely to push for recognition of impairment. The paper is 
inconclusive as to whether declining share price and PE ratios drive are a cause or an effect of 
impairment or both. 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
AbuGhazaleh, N., Al-Hares, O., & Haddad, A. E. (2012). The value relevance of goodwill 
impairments: UK evidence. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(4), 
206-216. 
Basi, B. A., & Penning, S. M. (2002). Let the investor beware Supply House Times, 5, 70-
74. 
Cheng, H., & Noland. (1995). The volatility of the PE ratio and its componets: A contras. 
Managerial Finance, 21(9), 25. 
Graham, H. (2013). Are you complying? Accounting and Business, 16(9), 49-51. 
Jennings, R., LeClere, M., & Thompson, R. (2001). Goodwill Amortisation and the 
Usefulness of Earnings. Financial Analysts Journal, 57(5), 20-28. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/faj.v57.n5.2478 
Kavcic, S., Jerman, M., & Kavcic, B. (2013). Goodwill reporting practices: evidence from a 
post-transition economy. Studia University Baes-Bolyai, 58(1), 40-55. 
Laghi, E., Mattei, M., & Marcantonio, M. (2013). Assessing the value relevance of 
goodwill impairment considering country-specific factors: Evidence from EU 
listed companies. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 5(7), 32-49. 
18 
 
Li, Z., Shroff, P., Venkataraman, R., & Zhang, I. (2011). Causes and consequences of 
goodwill impairment losses. Review of Accounting Studies, 16(4), 745-778. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11142-011-9167 
Malkiel, B. G. (2003). The efficient market hypothesis and its critics. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 59-82. 
Massoud, M. F., & Raiborn, C. A. (2003). Accounting for goodwill: are we better off? . 
review of Business, 24(2), 26-32. 
Moehrle, S., Reynolds-Moehrle, J., & Wallace, J. (2001). How Informative are Earnings 
Numbers that Exclude Goodwill Amortisation? Accounting Horizons, 5(3), 243-
255. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch.2001.15.3.243 
The Economist (14 May 2013). Goodwill Hunting, The Economist: London. 
Wang, J., & Hooper, K. (2014). "To be or not to be": impairment practices among Indian 
Listed Companies. Corporate ownership & Control Journal, 11(4), 184-192. 
Wang, V. (2011). Is amortisation good enough? evidenc from the U.K. goodwill 
accounting. Journal of International Management Studies, 6(1), 1-7. 
Wiese, A. (2005). Accounting for goodwill: The transition from amortisation to 
impairment - an impact assessment. Meditari Accountancy Research, 13(1), 105-
120. doi:doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/10222529200500007 
Wisniewski, T. P., Lightfoot, G., & Lilley, S. (2012). Speculating on presidential success: 
exploring the link between the price-earnings ratio and approval ratings. Journal 
of Economics and Finance, 36(1), 106-122. 
Zhang, H., & Liu, X. (2010). On the construction of China's accounting standard system 
with international convergence in accouting standards. International Journal of 
Busniess and Management, 5(4), 200-202-203. 
 
 
